Introduction
An outstanding feature of the works of the many historians intrigued by the ways in which the Arab Middle East reacted to, or held out against, the impact of the West is their foremost concern with ideas and ideologies, or cultural and intellectual forces and developments, rather than with the linear assumptions of diplomatic history. As Hisham Sharabi wrote in his Arab Intellectuals and the West:
The Arab Awakening, the term Arab intellectuals have used to describe the process of "modernization," ... involved a new sort of awareness. It brought about both new perceptions of the traditional heritage and attempts at adaptation to new conditions. In many ways it was a rending experience. On the social level it led to transformation and change involving loss of social cohesion; psychologically it reflected both widening selfconsciousness and alienation. 1
In this article I wish to look at one particular instance of Western influence that may well have helped accelerate such a process 2 Given the new light their preoccupation with "Syria" can help throw on the emergence of a Syrian identity among these intellectuals, it comes as somewhat of a surprise that this aspect of the American missionaries' activities has so far received little or no attention. This Syrian identity was a cultural one, Syrian patriotism a territorial one. As C. Ernest Dawn put it:
Many, perhaps all, of the early Western-influenced intellectuals of the Ottoman territories and Egypt held overlapping self-views without any sense of contradiction. ... All talked about fatherland and patriotism, watan and wataniyya, but one person could have more than one watan and more than one nation (umma). Among some, the smaller watan sometimes seemed to be the most important center of loyalty. Tahtawi's Egyptianism has long been the subject of scholarly attention. Just as important was Bustani's Syrian patriotism. But ... they did not subordinate the broader identities to the narrower. 3 That is, nationalism-that other corollary of modernity-is as yet barely on the horizon. But if we accept that national identity and national consciousness, and thus nations themselves, are constructs, the force that shapes them, even when it invents them, must find something to shape or invent, or even "obliterate." This
